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Union Wages, Rents, and Skills
in Health Care Labor Markets*
BARRY T. HIRSCH
Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306

EDWARD J. SCHUMACHER
East Carolina University, Greenville, NC 27858

We examine the effect of unions on the earnings of health care workers, with emphasis
on the measurement and sources of union wage premiums. Using data constructed
from the 1973 though 1994 Current Population Surveys, standard union premium
estimates are found to be substantially lower among workers in health care than in
other sectors of the economy, and to be smaller among higher skill than among lower
skill occupational groups. Longitudinal analysis of workers switching union status,
which controls for worker-specific skills, indicates a small impact of unions on earn
ings within both high and low skilled health care occupations. Evidence is found for
small, but significant, union threat effects in health care labor markets. It has been
argued that recent legal changes in bargaining unit determination should enhance
union organizing and bargaining power. Although we cannot rule this out, such
effects are not readily apparent in our data.
I. Introduction
During the last decade, registered nurses (RNs) and, to a lesser extent, other health
care personnel have realized significant wage gains relative to similar workers outside
the health care sector. Not well understood is the role of labor unions in the determi
nation of earnings in health care labor markets. Past estimates of union-nonunion
wage differentials suggest that union premiums are rather small (Adamache and
Sloan, 1982; Bruggink et al., 1985; Cain et al., 1981; Feldman and Scheffler, 1982).
Recent changes in the interpretation of labor law by the NLRB, however, have raised
the possibility of increased union activity and bargaining power among health care
workers. The growth of managed care, which has focused attention on staffing and
labor costs (e.g., Rosenthal, 1996), has generated renewed interest among health care
workers in union representation. Moreover, the AFL-CIO has recently indicated that
the health care industry will be a major focus of its organizing efforts. Understanding
the past impact of unions in health care labor markets, therefore, is crucial for assess
ing prospects for the future.
One of the more comprehensive studies on unions in health care labor markets
is by Cain et al. (1981), who focus exclusively on hospitals. The authors utilize three
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alternative data sets: the Current Population Surveys for May 1 973-1976, four Indus
try Wage Surveys between 1966 and 1975, and the 1976 Guide of the American Hos
pital Association, supplemented with a survey conducted by the authors. Cain et al.
find small union-nonunion wage differentials among hospital employees in general,
with about a 3 percent premium among private sector RNs. They also examine the
possibility of union threat effects, finding evidence that unions increase the wages of
both union and nonunion workers. Their hospital data suggest that a doubling of
union density among private sector non-professional workers from 20 to 40 percent
would increase both union and nonunion wages by 5 to 1 3 percentage points.
Other studies have found smaller union premiums for nurses than for lower
skilled health care occupations, and lower premiums for hospital workers than for
similar workers in nonhealth care settings. For example, Feldman and Scheffler
(1982) examined how the union premium changes with age of the union and found
that membership in a union less than eight years old increases RN wages by about
6 percent and licensed practical nurse (LPN) wages by about 8 percent (membership
in older unions resulted in larger differentials). Secretaries and housekeepers, in con
trast, realized premiums of about 13 percent. Hirsch and Schumacher (1995) obtained
union premiums for all RNs of about 3 percent (and for hospital RNs about 2 per
cent), while for LPNs and nursing aides they obtained union premium estimates of
4.6 and 1 2.4 percent. With the exception of Hirsch and Schumacher, whose focus is
on monopsony and not the union wage premium, these studies utilized data sets from
the 1 970s, focused on a narrow geographic area, or are limited by small sample sizes.
None of the previous studies employed panel data to estimate union premiums.
We examine the role of unions in health care labor markets, with a special
emphasis on nursing.l Using data from 1 973 through 1994, we provide evidence
showing the extent of unionization, changes over time in union organizing activity,
the magnitude of the union wage premium, and the effect of union density on union
and nonunion wages for selected occupations in the health care industry. Sources of
the union premium are then examined. By utilizing the longitudinal structure of the
Current Population Survey (CPS) the union-nonunion differential is decomposed into
a part representing an equalizing differential for (otherwise unmeasured) worker
skill, and a part representing rents, enhancing our understanding of the source of the
union wage differential. The paper provides an updated analysis of the role of unions
in health care labor markets, examines how changes in labor law have influenced the
bargaining power of health care unions, and provides insight into the possible effects
of the AFL-CIO's planned focus on organization in the health care sector.
Two standard findings in the empirical literature are that economy-wide union
wage differentials are substantially lower for high-skilled workers than for low-skilled
workers (Lewis, 1986; Hirsch and Schumacher, 1998) and that unionism is associated
with lower wage dispersion (Freeman, 1 980). Due to their representative nature and
the political process within a union, the goals and actions of a union are likely to favor
preferences of members with median preferences and, similarly, "average" workers
are more likely to be organized. Because of contractual wage standardization, imply-
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ing less individual-based wage dispersion, workers with high ability find unions less
attractive since they may earn higher wages in the nonunion sector. Those with low
ability have difficulty acquiring union jobs since queues for these jobs allow employ
ers to be selective (Abowd and Farber, 1982). The implication of differential matching
in union and nonunion jobs is that in lower skilled occupations, union establishments
will tend to hire relatively high-ability workers, as compared to nonunion establish
ments. In high-skill occupations, union work sites will attract workers with relatively
low ability, as compared to nonunion work sites. The implications of this type of
labor market sorting for the measurement of union wage premiums among health
care workers will be examined.
In the next section, we present detailed cross-sectional evidence on union
nonunion wage differentials and the effects of union density on union and nonunion
wages among RNs, health technicians, and health service workers. Section III pro
vides longitudinal wage change analysis that permits a decomposition of the union
premium into skill- and nonskill-related components. We review in Section IV recent
changes in labor law relating to the health care sector and provide descriptive evi
dence on union organizing and membership density. Conclusions follow in Section V

II. Cross-Sectional Evidence on the Union Premium
Data and Descriptive Evidence. Our cross-sectional data are drawn from the May
CPS for 1973 through 1981, and the monthly CPS Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG)
earnings files for January 1983 through December 1994. Between 1973 and 1978 the
earnings supplement was conducted once a year in May, but all persons in the sample
were administered the questions. In 1979, a half sample of the May CPS contains
both earnings and union information, while only quarter samples are available for
1980 and 1981. There was no union question in 1982. Beginning in 1983, union status
questions were added to the earnings supplement administered each month to a quar
ter sample (i.e., the outgoing rotation groups) of the CPS (monthly earnings supple
ments, absent the union status questions, began in January 1979).
Included in our sample are employed wage and salary workers ages 18 or over
whose major activity in the week prior to the survey was not schooling. The wage is
calculated as usual weekly earnings on the primary job (inclusive of tips, commis
sions, and overtime) divided by usual hours worked per week. For those small num
ber of workers whose weekly earnings are top-coded (at $999 through 1988 and
$1,923 beginning in 1989), we assign the estimated mean earnings above the cap
based on the assumption that the upper tail is characterized by a Pareto distribution. 2
We omit from the sample workers with implicit hourly earnings of less than $1 or
more than $99.99 December 1994 dollars. Further sample restrictions, discussed sub
sequently, are imposed for the longitudinal analysis.
In Table 1, descriptive data are presented on mean real wages (in December
1994 dollars) by union status, union membership density, and the unadjusted union
nonunion log wage differential. These figures are provided for a pooled 1973-1994
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Table 1

Mean Real Wages, Union Density, and the Unadjusted Union Wage Gap
by Occupation
Wu

WN

Density

InW0-InWN

N

Registered Nurses

18.00

16.43

0.157

0.096

38,555

Health Technicians

13.11

12.18

0.106

0.090

29,594

9.73

7.88

0.141

0.223

45,044

Health Care Workers:

Health Service
Occupations

Non-Health Workers in Health Industry:
School;:: 16

15.72

14.23

0.095

0.144

11,576

13$School$ 15

11.38

9.88

0.085

0.160

16,324

School $12

10.09

8.50

0.114

0.185

38,334

17.77

17.57

0.210

0.094

316,194

13$School$ 15

14.43

11.43

0.114

0.283

250,172

School $12

12.50

9.24

0.128

0.342

507,847

Non-Health Workers Outside Health Industry:
School2: 16

Notes:

Data ate from the May CPS supplements for 1973-1981 and the CPS ORG files for 1983-1994. Union data ate
not available in the CPS for 1982. Wu and W N ate real wages (in December 1994 dollats) for union and nonunion
workers, respectively. Density is the percentage of workers covered by a union contract. The unadjusted log wage

differential is represented by ln Wu-ln WN, and N is the sample size. Health Technicians include clinical laboratory
technologists and technicians, dental hygienists, health record technologists and technicians, radiologic techni
cians, licensed practical nurses, and health technologists and technicians n.e.c. Health Service Occupations
include dental assistants, health aides, except nursing and nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants.

sample of three groups of health care workers based on high, medium, and low levels
of skill. The groups are, respectively, registered nurses, health technologists and tech
nicians, and health service occupations. 3 For comparison, we also construct two sets
of comparison groups in non-health occupations, one working within and the other
outside the health care sector. These comparison groups consist of workers in the
following broad occupational categories (with health occupations excluded): profes
sional specialty occupations; technicians and related support; sales, administrative
support, and clerical; and service occupations (except protective and household ser
vices). For example, secretarial and clerical workers employed in hospitals or the
offices of physicians would be included in the health care sector control groups,
while those employed outside the health care sector would be in the larger non-health
care sector comparison groups. The groups are segmented by skill based on educa
tion. For a comparison to RNs, we select those with at least a 4-year college degree.
For health technicians we select a medium skill comparison group of those with
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some college but not a 4-year degree, while for the health service occupations we
select a lower skill comparison group that includes those with 12 years of schooling
or less.
Over the 1973-1994 sample period, 15.7 percent of RNs are union members,
with unionized RN wages .096 log points higher than among nonunion workers. 4
Among the health technician sample, union density is lower and the unadjusted
union wage gap is similar to that of RNs. By contrast, the unadjusted union differen
tial of .223 among the lower skilled health service workers (e.g., nursing aides) is
more than double that for RNs and technicians. Among non-health workers within
the health care sector, we find a similar pattern to that of the nursing groups,
although there is less variation across schooling levels. The large control groups of
workers in non-health occupations employed outside the health care sector display
the expected skill pattern of union premiums. The comparison group of college grad
uates has an unadjusted log wage gap of .094, as compared to .283 among the group
with some college and .342 among those with a high school degree or less. With the
exception of the high-skilled group, the descriptive evidence is consistent with rela
tively weaker union effects within health care than outside the health care sector.

The Cross-Sectional Union Differential. Table 2 displays regression estimates of
union premiums for three groups of workers - health care workers (in tum divided
into RNs, health technicians, and health service workers), workers in non-health
occupations employed in health service industries, and non-health workers outside
the health service sector. The latter two worker comparison groups are in turn
divided into high-, medium-, and low-skill groups, proxied by completed years of
schooling. The union-nonunion wage differential is estimated from a pooled log
wage equation, with the coefficient on a membership dummy measuring the pre
mium. 5 The regressions include a dummy for hospital employment (for the health
service industries samples), plus controls for years of schooling, potential experience
and its square, and dummy variables for gender, race, marital status (2), part-time
status, large metropolitan area, region (8), and year (14). 6
Union wage effects are relatively small in the health care sector, similar to find
ings from most previous studies based on alternative data sources and earlier years.
Following control for measurable characteristics, unionized RNs receive wages .032
log points higher than "similar" nonunion RNs. Unionized health technicians realize
a .049 log point premium, while the differential within health service occupations is
.114 log points. Workers in non-health occupations employed in the health care sec
tor display union wage differentials of .049, .075, and .106 log points for the high-,
medium-, and low-skill groups. Among the large comparison groups of non-health
workers outside the health care sector, estimated union premiums are .031, .154, and
.193 log points among the high-, medium-, and low-skill (schooled) groups.
Table 2 also presents the wage differentials associated with hospital employment
for the health care workers and non-health workers employed in the health care sec
tor. Among all health and, to a lesser extent, non-health care occupations, hospital
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Table 2

Union and Hospital Log Wage Advantage for Health Care
and Non-Health Workers
Union

Hospital

Registered Nurses

0.032
(0.005)

0.159
(0.00 4)

Health Technicians

0.049
(0.007)

0.067
(0.004)

Health Service
Occupations

0.114
(0.005)

0.146
(0.0 0 4)

Health Care Workers:

Non-Health Workers in Health Industry:
School<: 16

0.049
(0.015)

0.087
(0.008)

13S SchoolS 15

0.075
(0.010)

0.067
(0.00 5)

SchoolS 12

0.106
(0.006)

0.095
(0.003)

Non-Health Workers outside Health Industry:
School<: 16

0.031
(0.002)

13S SchoolS 15

0.154
(0.003)

SchoolS 12

0.193
(0.002)

Notes: Data ate from the May CPS supplements for 1973-1981 and the CPS ORG files
for 1983-1994. Estimates are based on union and hospital coefficients from
wage level regressions with In W as the dependent variable. Other variables
included in the regressions ate yeats of schooling. potential experience and its
squate, dummies for public employment, race (2), gender, marital status (2),
latge metropolitan atea, part-time status, region (8) and yeat (14). The compari
son group regressions included 4 occupational dummy variables. Full regres
sion results for the nursing groups ate presented in Appendix I. Standatd errors
ate in patentheses.

employees realize a wage advantage relative to non-hospital employees. The hospital
premium is particularly large among RNs. Elsewhere we have shown that the hospi
tal premium for RNs results from a combination of higher unmeasured skills among
hospital nurses, more demanding working conditions, and, more problematically,
receipt of quasi-rents during a period of increasing employment (Schumacher and
Hirsch, 1997).
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In Appendix 1, wage equation coefficients on other variables are shown for the
three health service groups. Schooling coefficients are relatively small within the nar
rowly defined occupational groups, since these reflect only within-occupation rates of
return. Black health sector workers earn less than white workers, with the racial gap
here being somewhat larger than the economy-wide gap observed among women (but
not men). Although male workers earn a substantial premium in non-health-related
occupations, differences in wages by gender within health occupations are small. In
contrast to the large penalty for part-time workers in non-health occupations, there is
little or no difference in wages between full-time and part-time health care workers.
Although our analysis focuses on wages, note that unions affect fringe benefits as
well. In results not shown we examine fringe benefits by utilizing the March CPS sup
plements, which contain data on pensions and health insurance coverage. Consistent
with economy-wide evidence (Freeman, 1 981), we find among all the health (and
non-health) occupations a greater likelihood among union than nonunion workers
that the employer will both offer a pension and that the worker will participate. Simi
lar to the evidence on wages, union-nonunion differences in pensions are larger for
lower skilled than higher skilled occupational groups. Union workers also are more
likely than nonunion workers to be offered health insurance and, among those
offered insurance, to have part of the premium paid by the employer.
In this section we have seen that union wage differentials in the health care sec
tor are small in both absolute terms and relative to the differentials found among the
comparison groups of workers. Union power is typically displayed through both
increased membership and wages, although wage premiums and membership are
inversely related for a given level of union power (e.g., a movement along a labor
demand constraint versus an outward shift of the constraint). W hile health care
unions have union density levels not dissimilar from their comparison groups, their
apparent small effect on wages suggests that bargaining power is limited. Prior to
concluding that bargaining power in health care markets is weak, however, one must
examine the effects of unions on nonunion wages.

Union Threat Effects. The evidence to this point suggests that unionized RNs
earn about 3-4 percent higher wages than similar nonunion RNs. It cannot be
assumed, however, that the absence of unions would cause average RN wages to con
verge to the current nonunion level, since unions have a potential influence on
nonunion as well as union wages. The union impact on nonunion wages can be classi
fied into labor spillover, demand, and union threat effects. Spillover and demand
effects result in lower wages in the nonunion sector due, in the former case, to a
wage-induced movement of employment out of the union and into the nonunion sec
tor, and in the latter, to decreased industry demand for all inputs in the event that
industry-wide product prices increase. Threat effects, however, produce a positive
relationship between nonunion wages and union density, as nonunion employers
increase wages to deter organizing. Evidence on the effect of unions on nonunion
wages typically reveals the dominance of threat effects, as evinced by a positive rela
tionship of nonunion wages and industry union density, while finding little evidence
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for large spillover or demand effects on nonunion wages (Hirsch and Addison, 1986;
for contrasting evidence, see Neumark and Wachter, 1995).
In order to examine the effect of unionization on the wages of nonunion health
professionals, we examine how wages vary with local labor market health care union
density. Beginning with the October 1985 CPS, the Census identified 202 Metropoli
tan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with populations of 100,000 or more (the largest areas
are Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas). Here, we assign each worker in the
CPS to one of 252 market areas - the 202 MSAs plus 50 nonmetropolitan state
groups. We then calculate area-specific union densities for the entire health care sec
tor over the October 1 985 to December 1994 period, allowing these values to proxy
relative inter-area differences in health care union organizing strength (similar results
are obtained when we delete observations where cell sizes are small).
Table 3 presents the individual union dummy and area union density coeffi
cients (the latter interacted with individual union status) from log wage equations for
the three groups of health care workers. The results indicate rather clear-cut union
threat effects, with a tendency toward stronger density effects on nonunion than
union wages and stronger threat effects among lower skilled health occupations than
among RNs. For example, a unionized RN in a labor market with 25 percent union
density will have wages .014 log points higher than a unionized RN in a market with
5 percent union density (a density effect of .068 times .20). Wages for nonunion RNs

Table 3

Union Threat Effects
Union

U*Den

N*Den

p-value

Registered Nurses

0.044
(0.012)

0.068
(0.046)

0.127
(0.030)

0.233

Health Technicians

0.0 49
(0.0 17)

0.198
(0.067)

0.250
(0.036)

0.441

Health Service Occupations

0.124
(0.014)

0.204
(0.051)

0.297
(0.029)

0.073

Non-Health Workers in

0.074
(0.013)

0.327
(0.049)

0.252
(0.024)

0.130

Health Care Industry

Notes: Data are from the October 1985-December 1994 CPS ORG files. U*Den and N*Den are coefficients on union
density interacted with union and nonunion status, respectively. Union density is calculated for health industry
sector workers in 202 standard metropolitan statistical areas and 50 non-MSA state areas. The p-value is for the
hypothesis that the coefficients on density are equal for union and nonunion members. Other variables included in
the regressions are schooling, potential experience and its square, and dummies for marital status (2), gender, race
(2), region (8), large metropolitan area, part-time status, and year (7). Regressions for health care workers include
a dummy for hospital employment.
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will be an estimated .025 higher in the more unionized labor market. Union threat
effects for health technicians and other health service occupations are substantially
larger, as are union wage premiums. In short, estimated union-nonunion wage differ
entials understate the total impact of labor unions on the wages of union and
nonunion health care personnel. In results not shown, we find that union density
effects were stronger after 1991 than prior to 1991 (e.g., a 20 percent increase in
union density would increase nonunion wages by about 2 percent before and 3 per
cent after 1991). The year 1991 is significant because that is when the Supreme Court
affirmed the NLRB's rulemaking policy with respect to hospital bargaining units.
Changes in the legal framework are discussed later.

III. Longitudinal Analysis of the Union Premium
The cross-sectional estimates of health sector union wage premiums reported above
are similar to those found in previous studies based on less recent data. Prior studies,
however, have not been able to evaluate whether the union-nonunion wage differen
tial represents a rent to union workers or a compensating differential for unmeasured
differences in skills. If worker skills are not adequately measured by the standard
variables, and omitted human capital is correlated with union status, then the union
coefficient will be a biased measure of the union premium (Brown, 1980). Jakubson
(1991), among others, presents evidence that this is the case for the economy as a
whole. In this section we use the panel structure of the CPS to determine the extent
of such bias, and to obtain estimates of the union premium net of worker-specific
skill differences.

The Wage Change Model and CPS Panel Data. Below, we modify a standard log
wage earnings equation to account for unmeasured worker-specific skill differences
fixed over a one-year period. Letting Ij represent the fixed effect on log wages for
worker i and adding a time subscript t, the log wage equation estimated above can be
written as:
(1)
where ln ��is the log real wage of worker i in year t; X consists of variables (indexed
by j) measuring personal and job related characteristics; f3 are the respective coeffi
cients; UNION is a dummy variable equal to one if the worker is a union member
while () is a measure of the union-nonunion log wage differential; and YEAR
includes year dummies (indexed by y). The error term is divided into an individual
specific quality component (Ij) assumed fixed over time (one year with our data) and
a random, well behaved, component (ei1). If the omitted fixed effect is positively cor
related with union status (i.e., more able workers are selected into union jobs), then
estimates of the union wage premium from equation 1 are biased upward.
Letting the symbol L1 represent changes between adjacent years, a wage change
equation will take the form (dropping the individual subscript i):
Llln\\J

=

'i.f3jL1 JS d + OLlUNION d + 'i.rd PERIODd + Lled ,

(2)
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where d indexes the time period over which changes are calculated, and PER/ODd
are dummies for the periods 1984/5 through 1993/4 (with 1983/4 the reference
period) which capture differences in real wage growth across years. In equation 2,
the effects owing to unmeasured ability fall out, potentially allowing for unbiased
estimates of the union premium, assuming that ability is equally valued at the margin
by employers in both sectors (Gibbons and Katz, 1992) and within a year's time (i.e.,
skills are fully transferable). The estimate of the union premium is based on the
change in wages for individuals who either switch into or out of union membership
(we subsequently address the possibility of measurement error in the union change
variable). If the union premium is due entirely to unions attracting higher ability
workers, then the estimate of () in the wage change equation should be zero, assum
ing marginal products are equivalent across sectors. ?
In order to estimate equation 2, panel data with observations on individuals in at
least two periods are required. As described above, the CPS earnings supplement
questions are asked of individuals in the same month for consecutive years (i.e., rota
tion group 4 in year t and rotation group 8 in year t+1 ). CPS panels for the year-pairs
1983/84 through 1993/94 provide unusually large files for longitudinal analysis,
including sufficient numbers of union status switchers among nurses and other health
professionals. Appendix 2 describes how the panel data set is constructed. Because
the Census reinterviews households in fixed locations, individuals whose households
move or who move out of a household during the year are not represented in the
sample (young workers are most likely to be eliminated). In order to minimize mea
surement error in the longitudinal sample, individuals for whom the Census has allo
cated values of industry, occupation, earnings, or union status (the union allocation
flag is available only since 1989) in either year t or t+l, and those few workers dis
playing unusually large log wage changes (less than -1.0 or greater than 1.0), are
deleted from the sample. The occupational samples (i.e., RNs, health technicians,
and health service workers) include only workers employed in the same occupational
category in both years, thus allowing us to focus on the wage effects associated with
changes in union status. Although the longitudinal samples are not as representative
of the employed labor force as are the cross-sectional samples, we obtain similar
wage level equation results from the two samples.

Wage Change Estimates of Union Premiums. Table 4 presents the results of the
"fixed effects" or wage change regression models estimated for the three groups of
health care workers and their respective comparison groups. 8 For comparison, the
first column presents the union coverage coefficient from a standard log wage regres
sion estimated in levels using observations from the second year in the panel. These
estimates are similar to wage level estimates presented in Table 1 based on the larger
samples. The second column displays wage change results. For RNs, the already
small coefficient on union status falls from .032 in the levels regression to .0 ll in the
wage change regression. The results for the other two groups of health care workers
suggest that much of the cross-sectional union differential is in fact a compensating
differential for unmeasured worker skills. Estimated union premiums for health tech-
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Table 4

Wage Change Regression Results

Registered Nurses
lnW
Union

LllnW

0.032

0.064
(0.008)

Sample size

0.011

0.071

(0.010)

(0.019)
33,624

Health Technicians

Comparison Group
13 �School�15

t.lnW

0.042

0.174
(0.006)

Sample size

0.0 14

0.108

(0.0 14)

(0.0 16)
36,268

4,743

Health Service Occs
1nW

�nW

Notes:

Comparison Group
School� 12
�nw

lnW

0. 108

0.228

(0.012)

(0.004)

t-Union

LllnW

lnW

(0.015)
t.Union

Sample size

�nW

7,583

lnW

Union

School� 16
lnW

(0.009)
t-Union

Union

Comparison Group

0.098

0.033
(0.012)
5,856

(0.011)
69,792

Data are from the CPS ORO panels from 1983/4 to 1993/4 (see Appendix 2). Columns under lnW are levels
regressions using the log real wage in the second year as the dependent variable. Columns under �In W are wage
change regressions using the change in the log real wage as the dependent variable. The comparison group
excludes workers in the health care sector; these regressions include dummies for changing occupation. The
change in union coefficient reported for the control group is for those who reported changing union status as well

as occupation and industry. Dummies for the three other types of union changes were also included. See text for a
description of the comparison groups. Other variable in the regressions are the change in hospital status (for the
health occupations), change in public employment, change in part-time status, change in experience squared, and

9 period dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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nicians fall from .042 to .014 as we move from a wage level to wage change equa
tion, while premiums among health service workers (e.g., nursing aids) fall from .108
to .033.
Were substantial measurement error in the union change variable not a real pos
sibility, we would readily conclude that much of what is an already small wage
advantage among unionized health care workers in fact reflects higher unmeasured
skills among union than nonunion workers, rather than union bargaining power.
Given that measurement error is likely to bias these coefficients toward zero, such a
strong conclusion is not possible. More clear-cut is the finding that the longitudinal
union estimates drop most sharply for the lower skilled health service group of work
ers. The implication is that among lower wage occupations, union wage standardiza
tion and employer selection lead to the matching of workers with high (unmeasured)
skills into union jobs, as compared to nonunion workers with identical measured
characteristics. What appears to be a substantial union premium among lower skill
health care workers in fact largely reflects these differences in worker skills and not
union bargaining power. Likewise, previous researchers have noted the particularly
low union premiums for high-skilled health care workers, arguing that "nurses and
other hospital workers may view collective bargaining as incompatible with the ethos
of their professional mission, and where organized, they may be reluctant to exercise
their bargaining power by traditional union pressure tactics" (Cain et al., p. 193). We
offer a complementary explanation. Owing to within- and across-employer wage
standardization, employers find it difficult to attract the most able RNs into union
workplaces.
The selection by skill type that is hinted at among health care workers is readily
evident in the economy-wide comparison group sample (Hirsch and Schumacher,
1998), where measurement error is not a major concern (see footnote 8). In contrast
to the cross-sectional result of low union premiums among high-skill and large pre
miums among low-skill workers, the longitudinal estimates indicate similar union
premiums of about .07 to .11 log points, with far smaller differences across skill
groups than suggested by standard wage level analysis. These results indicate that
union employers are able to select relatively high quality union (as compared to
nonunion) workers with low levels of measured skills, while the most able among
workers with high measured skills are not likely to be in the union queue. In short,
unionization is associated with a relatively compressed distribution of worker skills,
as compared to the skill distribution among nonunion workers.

IV. The Legal Structure and Changes over Time in Union Organizing
and Density

Our evidence indicates that unions have had rather modest effects on the wages of
health care workers. This section identifies recent changes in the legal structure sur
rounding union organizing in hospitals and examines possible implications of these
changes. Prior to the mid-1970s, unionization in hospitals and much of the health
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care sector was limited. Federal hospitals were first covered by the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) in January 1962 by Executive Order 10988. A series of cases
decided by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in 1967 extended its juris
diction to most private for-profit hospitals. The most important spur to union organiz
ing was Public Law 93-360, passed on August 25, 1974, which brought voluntary
nonprofit hospitals under coverage of the NLRA, while also including provisions that
lengthened the strike notice period and required federal mediation of disputes. This
law enabled the NLRB to conduct representation elections in hospitals and to man
date good faith bargaining. Union activity increased substantially after the passage of
Public Law 93-360. The number of hospitals with at least one collective bargaining
agreement increased from 912 in 1974 to I ,635 in 1977 (Feldman and Scheffler,
1982, p. 198). As seen in Table 5, elections in the health service industry increased
from 248 in 1974, to 579 in 1975, and to a peak total of 746 in 1977 (NLRB Annual
Reports). Union membership density in hospitals, based on our calculations from the
CPS, increased from 13.0 percent in 1974, to 16.8 percent in 1981. Because the
"flow" of new members from elections is typically small as compared to the "stock"
of existing union employment, changes in organizing activity show up more rapidly
in the NLRB election data than in the CPS union density figures.
Because of concern about work stoppages, Congress included an admonition in
the committee notes to Public Law 93-360 to prevent undue proliferation of bargain
ing units in the health care industry (Mackender, 1992). They did not provide specific
instructions, however, and the NLRB's approach to bargaining unit determination
went through several stages. Initially the NLRB applied a "community-of-interest"
doctrine to hospital bargaining units, attempting to group employees with similar
functions and skills. Generally, the board recognized five units: registered nurses,
other professionals, technical employees, service and maintenance workers, and busi
ness-office clerical (NLRB, 1988). Employers challenged these definitions as too
narrow and appeals courts frequently overturned NLRB decisions (Gullett and Kroll,
1990). In a 1984 case (St. Francis II) the board adopted a "disparity of interest" test
for unit determination (St. Francis Hospital, 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 953, 1984), permit
ting larger disparities between wages, hours, and working conditions than previously
allowed. This change resulted in essentially two bargaining units: professional and
nonprofessional employees (NLRB, 1 988).
The decision in St. Francis II was appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals, which ruled that the NLRB erroneously applied the disparity of
interest test. After the case was remanded to the Board, the NLRB moved to a "rule
making" approach, and in 1989 the Board established eight bargaining units in the
health care industry: physicians, registered nurses, professionals except physicians
and registered nurses, technical employees, skilled maintenance employees, business
office clerical employees, guards, and other nonprofessional employees (NLRB,
1988). Psychiatric hospitals and nursing homes were not covered under the new rules
and acceptable bargaining units in these sectors would be evaluated on a case-by
case basis. The American Hospital Association filed suit seeking to permanently
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enjoin the Board from enforcing the rule. The district court found the rules violated
the congressional admonition to avoid undue proliferation and issued an injunction.
The Seventh Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision arguing that the rule
making approach was sufficiently broad. Finally in April 1991, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision in a unanimous opinion making the rule
enforceable by the Board (American Hospital Association v. NLRB, I l l S. Ct. 1539,
1991). Hence, the current standard is the rulemaking approach as outlined in 1 989.
It was expected that the 1 991 Supreme Court decision and the rulemaking
approach to unit determination would strengthen union organization. Union represen
tation is a collective good in that many of the services provided are nonrival and non
excludable. That is, individual workers cannot be excluded from contract provisions
covering layoffs, work rules, promotion or from commonly provided working condi
tions (safety, hours of work, etc.). The more similar are employees' preferences
within a bargaining unit, the lower the cost of organizing and the easier it is for a
union to provide a mix of "services" that can gain and maintain majority support. 9
Schwarz and Koziara (1992) have examined how bargaining units affect wages,
strikes, and jurisdictional disputes in hospitals. They find little, if any, evidence that
an increased number of bargaining units leads to higher wage settlements. Only
where there are 5 or 6 units (which occurs only about 7 percent of the time) are RN
wages significantly higher than hospitals with only one bargaining unit. Hospitals
with more than 6 units do not have wages significantly higher than those with only
one unit. They find no relationship between bargaining units and the wages of LPNs
and other health care workers.
Although it is difficult to evaluate the effects of NLRB unit determination on
union organizing strength, there is little in the descriptive data presented in Table 5
that would suggest a large impact, a finding consistent with the results in Schwarz
and Koziara. The only obvious breaks in the union election series are the increase in
elections following the 1974 passage of Public Law 93-360, and the sharp drop in
elections after 1981. The latter, of course, was an economy-wide phenomenon (Chai
son and Dhavale, 1991), as seen in Table 5 by a relatively constant proportion of
health service to economy-wide representation elections. And, not surprisingly, there
are no obvious changes in CPS union membership density among our three groups of
health care workers that can be ascribed to labor law changes.
Greater bargaining power may show up not only in increased membership, but
also in larger union wage premiums or stronger union threat effects. We can mention
briefly the results of estimating separate union wage premiums by time period (these
results are not shown). For the health care sector as a whole, as well as for health
technicians and workers in lower skill health service occupations, standard regression
estimates of union wage premiums are remarkably stable over the 1973-1994 period.
The one exception that we find is for hospital-based RNs, who realize an estimated
union premium during the (pooled) 1 992-1994 period of about 5 percent, as com
pared to a premium of about 2-3 percent during earlier years. Such evidence is con
sistent with enhanced bargaining power among hospital RNs following the Supreme
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Table 5

Union Organizing Activity and Membership Density in the Health Care Industry
Health Service Industry
Total
Year

Elections

%Union
Wins

Union Density (%)

All Industries

Total
Votes Cast

Total
Elections

%Union
Wins

�
::I:
:::0

Cll

Total
Votes Cast

Ratio

RN

HT

HS

()
::I:

§

0..

tT1
0

1966

6

50.0

291

8,324

60.8

534,454

.001

-

-

1967

6

83.3

369

8,116

59.0

554,133

.001

-

-

1968

108

81.5

4,098

7,857

57.2

566,164

.014

-

1969

135

62.2

4,714

7,993

54.6

526,419

.Ol7

1970

!53

64.1

6,680

8,074

55.2

531,402

.019

-

-

1971

225

67.1

10,708

8,362

53.2

514,284

.027

-

-

1972

250

62.0

10,818

8,923

53.6

519,477

.028

-

1973

254

64.6

12,826

9,369

51.1

480,303

.027

6.0

8.2

10.1

1974

248

60.9

11,997

8,858

50.0

482,414

.028

8.0

9.6

12.4

-

�
:::0
0

._
-

Cll

()
::I:
c::
-

:s::

fs::I:

1975

579

59.8

41,828

8,577

48.2

501,996

.068

9.8

9.9

12.4

1976

710

58.6

53,671

8,638

48.1

418,347

.082

12.1

8.1

13.8

1977

746

54.7

58,947

9,484

46.0

504,241

.079

11.9

12.7

14.0

1978

596

54.4

43,100

8,240

46.0

417,563

.072

15.0

12.0

14.1

1979

528

53.0

40,482

8,043

45.0

506,040

.066

14.8

14.5

16.0

1980

695

50.6

62,812

8,198

45.7

458,114

.085

19.7

9.5

13.6

1981

653

52.5

55,591

7,512

43.1

392,157

.087

17.4

8.6

14.3

tT1
:::0

I -

l;J
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Table 5 - Continued

Total

Year

Total
Elections

%Union
Wins

Votes Cast

Total
Elections

%Union
Wins

1982

473

49.0

40,161

5,1 16

1983

378

54.8

28,923

1984

386

56.2

,�

Union Density (%)

All Industries

Health Service Industry

Total
Votes Cast

Ratio

40.3

257,599

.092

4,405

43.0

181,305

28,741

4,436

42.0

RN

HT

HS

.086

16.0

12. 1

15.6

22 1,023

.087

15.7

1 1.4

15.3

42.4

224,116

.077

15.1

10.0

14.4

1985

356

55.3

30,140

4,614

1986

373

50.9

30,837

4,520

43.2

229,239

.083

15.2

10.2

13.8

1987

352

54.8

29,602

4,069

43.9

212,825

.087

15.5

9.6

13.5

1988

342

53.8

29,257

4,153

46.3

214,092

.082

15.3

10.3

12.1

1989

296

53.0

22,910

4,4 13

46.7

239,934

.067

16.3

10.4

12.8

1990

367

56.7

30,124

4,210

46.7

229,242

.087

16.6

10.7

13.0

199 1

342

52.3

25,3 13

3,752

44.3

195,876

.091

16.8

9.2

13.0

1992

299

54.5

24,653

3,599

46.5

193,035

.083

15.8

10.4

13.4

58.3

26,24 1

3,586

47.6

.090

15.9

10.5

13.2

17.9

10.5

14.3

1993
1994

324

20 1,557

-

Notes: Union elections data are from the National Labor Relations Board's Annual Reports 1966-1993, Table 16. Total Elections is the total number of elections in the fiscal year ending
September 30. % Union Wins is the percent of elections in which representative rights were won by unions, and Total Votes Cast is the total number of votes cast in the elections.
Ratio is the ratio of health service industry union elections to total union elections in all industries. Union Density data are from the CPS ORO files. Union membership is not
available for 1982. Health Technicians (HT) includes clinical laboratory technologists and technicians, dental hygienists, health record technologists and technicians, radiologic
technicians, licensed practical nurses, and health technologists and technicians n.e.c. Health Service Occupations (HS) include dental assistants, health aides except nursing, and
nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants.
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Court's 1991 decision. However, because the absolute levels of the premiums are low
and the change over time is small relative to the standard error of the estimates, we
are reluctant to attach heavy weight to such evidence. Likewise, we previously noted
that estimated union threat effects (measured by the impact of local area union den
sity on the wages of nonunion workers) show a small increase in the impact of
unions on nonunion wages after 1991, again consistent with enhanced union power
following the Supreme Court decision. Absent stronger evidence, we are reluctant to
ascribe our wage results to the shift in NLRB rules on hospital organizing. A more
conclusive determination of the effects of NLRB policy must await further evidence.
V. Conclusions

We have provided an analysis of union effects in health care labor markets. Consistent
with previous research, we find that standard union wage premium estimates are sub
stantially smaller for health care workers than for workers outside the health care
sector, and are smaller among RNs than among lower skill health care workers.
Longitudinal analysis controlling for worker-specific abilities also shows small union
effects in health care markets. In contrast to the wage level evidence, longitudinal
results indicate only small differences in union premiums across skill groups. Much
of the observed union wage advantage among workers in lower skilled health occu
pations is not a rent but, rather, compensation for high unmeasured skills. Wage pre
miums create queues for union jobs and employers avoid hiring workers with very
low skills. Because of union wage standardization and limited merit-based wage dis
persion, however, workers who are most able are least likely to select union jobs.
Thus, while high unmeasured skills owing to employer selection account for much of
the union wage advantage among workers with low levels of measured skills, union
nonunion differences in unmeasured skills are less important among workers with
higher levels of measured skills.
Taken together, our evidence indicates that labor union effects on wages in health
care labor markets are small, regardless of whether they are estimated in levels or
changes. During the 1980s health care expenditures were rising rapidly, and the earn
ings of health care workers (especially RNs) were increasing in both real and relative
terms. Despite the favorable economic climate, unions had a rather modest impact on
the earnings of union and nonunion health care workers. We find no clear-cut evidence
of a large impact from recent changes in bargaining unit determination within hospi
tals, although our results hint at some increased union bargaining power after 1991.
W hile it is difficult to predict what will occur over the next several years, our
results suggest that the AFL-CIO's attempts to organize in the health care industry
will have limited success. The increased competitiveness of the health care sector
and a slowdown in demand growth for hospital-based health care workers suggest
that union organizing ability and bargaining power may in fact diminish. If unions
were unable to obtain significant wage gains for their members in an economic envi
ronment relatively conducive to bargaining, it is unlikely that the union impact will
increase in a more competitive environment. In the short run unions may be effective

142

JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH

in maintaining existing wages levels for their members, and union-nonunion wage
differentials may increase owing to greater downward wage flexibility among
nonunion health care workers. Likewise, increased risks of job and wage loss accom
panying changes in health delivery systems may increase worker interest in organiz
ing. In the long run, however, sizable union wage premiums will be difficult to
sustain. The ultimate role of unions in a more competitive health care sector will
hinge on the degree of cooperation and conflict in the labor relations environment,
the relative productivity of union and nonunion establishments, and the success of
human resource practices that prevail in union and nonunion work sites.10
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Appendix 1

Cross-Sectional Regression Results
Health

Union Membership

Hospital

Public

Schooling

Experience

Exr!wo

Black

Male

Married, Spouse
Present
Divorced, Separated,
or Widowed
Large Metropolitan Area

Part-Time Status

Adj. R2
Sample Size

Registered

Health

Service

Nurses

Technicians

Occs

0.032

0.049

0.114

(0.005)

(0.007)

(0.005)

0.159

0.067

0. 146

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

0.019

-0.014

0.067

(0.004)

(0.006)

(0.005)

0.033

0.074

0.04 1

(0.001)

(0.00 1)

(0.00 1)

0.013

0.018

0.01 1

(0.001)

(0.00 1)

(0.000)

-0.027

-0.033

-0.021

(0.00 1)

(0.00 1)

(0.001)

-0.095

-0.055

-0.078

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.004)

0.028

0.070

0.045

(0.008)

(0.006)

(0.006)

0.015

0.057

0.069

(0.005)

(0.006)

(0.005)

0.015

0.028

0.026

(0.006)

(0.007)

(0.005)

0. 102

0.099

0.115

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.004)

0.007

0.002

-0.029

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.004)

0.187

0.222

0.216

38,555

29,594

45,044

Notes: Data are from the May CPS supplements for 1973-1981 and the CPS ORO files

for 1983-1994. Union data are not available in the CPS for !982. RN is registered nurses; Tech is health technicians; HS is health services occupations; and
other variables included in the regressions were dummies for other race, region
(8) and year (19). Results for union membership and hospital correspond to
those shown in Table 2. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Appendix 2

Construction of the Longitudinal Sample from the CPS ORG Files

T he CPS sample design is such that households are included in 8 surveys ( rotation groups), beginning with
4 consecutive months in, followed by 8 months out, followed by 4 months in. Outgoing rotation groups
4 and 8 are asked earnings supplement questions ( weekly earnings, hours, union status, etc.). The CPS
contains household identification numbers ( ID) and record line numbers, but not individual identifiers.
Individuals potentially can be identified for the same month in consecutive years; that is, individuals in
rotation 4 in year 1 can be matched to individuals in rotation 8 in year 2.
The longitudinal ORG file was created in the following manner. Separate data files were created for
males and females, and for pairs of years (rotation 4/1983 and rotation 8/1984, rotation 41\984 and rota
tion 8/1985, etc.). Within each file, individuals were sorted as appropriate on the basis of ascending and
descending household ID, year, and age. To be considered an acceptable matched pair, a rotation 8 individ
ual had to be matched with a rotation 4 individual with identical household ID, identical survey month,
and an age difference between

0 and 2 ( since surveys can occur on different days of the month, age change

need not equal 1 ). Several passes were necessary because a single household may contain more than one
male or female pair. Checks were provided to insure that only unique matches were selected. For each
rotation 8 individual, the search was made through all rotation 4 individuals with the same ID to make sure
there was only I possible match; the file was resorted in reverse order and each selected rotation 4 individ
ual was checked to insure a unique rotation 8 match. As uniquely matched pairs were identified they were
removed from the work file. Incorrect changes in the variables marital status, veteran status, race, and edu
cation ( e. g., a change in schooling other than

0 or I , a change from married to never married, etc.) were

used to delete "bad" observations in households where there were multiple observations and ages too close
to separate matched pairs. Several passes at the data were made. In households where two pairs of individ
uals could be separated based on a I year but not the 0 to 2 year age change, a I year criterion was used. If
a unique pair could not be identified based on these criteria, they were not included in the data set (e.g. ,
four observations with two identical pairs, or three individuals with two possible matches using the
age change criterion).

0 to 2

T here are several reasons why matches cannot be made or that individual worker pairs are not
included in the CPS ORG panel. The principal reasons are if a household moves (thus changing the house
hold ID), if an individual moves out of a household, if a worker becomes self employed, if an individual
drops out of the labor market or fails to meet other sample selection criteria, or if the Census is unable to
reinterview a household and/or receive information on the individual. Inclusion rates for the entire CPS
ORG panel are just under two-thirds of employed wage and salary workers in any year; rates are some
what lower in our RN sample. Peracchi and Welch ( 1995) analyze attrition rates among matched March
CPS files and conclude that age is the most important detenninant of a successful match. Other factors that
lessen match probabilities are poor health, low schooling, and not a household head, while gender and race
are unimportant match predictors following control for other factors. Finally, sample sizes are reduced
further to roughly half the normal size for the 1984/5 panel and to one-quarter for 1985/6 . This is the result
of a CPS test sample from July- September 1985 that implemented new population weights. Rotation 4
households interviewed in July 1984 through September 1985 were not reinterviewed a year later in !985
and 1986.
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NOTES
*The authors appreciate the assistance of David Macpherson, who helped develop the CPS data files used
in the paper.
1 Calculations from the CPS indicate that nurses (RNs, LPNs, and nursing aides) comprise close to 40 per
cent of total hospital wage and salary employment. In 1994 , 7 percent of all full-time female wage and
salary workers were employed in nursing (Employm ent and Earnings, January 1995, Table 56).
2Means above the earnings cap are taken from Hirsch and Macpherson (1996, p. 6), who estimate annual
gender-specific values from the Pareto distribution. Means in nominal dollars are roughly $1,500 for years
with a $999 cap and $3,000 for years with a $1,923 cap, with moderately higher values for men than
women and increases in the means over time.
3 Health Technologists and Technicians include clinical laboratory technologists and technicians, dental
hygienists, health record technologists and technicians, radiologic technicians, licensed practical nurses,
and health technologists and technicians, n.e.c. Health Service Occupations include dental assistants,
health aides except nursing, and nursing aides orderlies, and attendants.
4Log differentials can be converted to approximate percentage differentials by [exp(d) - 1 ] 100, where d is
the log differential. Information on collective bargaining coverage, defined as all union members plus non
members who say they are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, is available beginning in 1977.
Union coverage density is about 2 percentage points higher than is membership density.
5A

simple specification is used for ease of exposition. Union differential estimates based on separate union
and nonunion wage equations are highly similar. We do not consider the issue of union endogeneity. Sub
sequent longitudinal analysis controls for worker specific skills and thus corrects for some forms of selec
tivity bias.
6Since sample sizes for the years prior to 1983 are small, we include three-year group dummies for these
years (197 3-1975 is the omitted group) and separate year dummies for 198 3 and after.
7Jakubson (1991) finds no evidence that the first differencing technique outlined above is an overly restric
tive specification of the model when applied to union status.
8For the comparison groups we include four separate measures for the change in union status. Among
those who reported changing union status we included separate variables for those who also changed
occupation and industry, those who changed occupation but not industry, those who changed industry but
not occupation, and those who changed neither occupation or industry. T he coefficients reported in the
table are for those who changed both occupation and industry. As shown in Hirsch and Schumacher
(1998), this group is least likely to have changes in union status reported with error and its coefficient pro
vides the most reliable longitudinal estimate.
9For a discussion along these lines, see Hirsch and Addison ( 1986). Demsetz (199 3) provides an explicit
test for this thesis, finding that skill-homogeneous groups are more readily organized than skill-heteroge
neous groups. We should note that the 1991 decision is not the only one affecting union organizing of
health care workers. In a 1994 decision, NLRB v. Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America
(HCR) (92 S. Ct. 1964, 1994), the Supreme Court upheld a federal circuit court decision that LPNs at an
Ohio nursing home were supervisory employees and not covered by the legal protections of the NLRA.
Justice Kennedy, author of the 5 -4 majority decision, emphasized that the findings in this case were lim
ited to health care workers.
10Register ( 1988) provides evidence finding that union hospitals are more productive than nonunion hospi
tals. T his study is notable because it is one of the few studies that find positive union productivity effects
in a not-for-profit or relatively noncompetitive sector.
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